Remembering Aloha Airlines Flight 243

Remembering Aloha Airlines Flight 243

On April 28th, 1988, the roof of an Aloha Airlines plane ripped off in mid-air at 24,000 feet. However, the pilot still managed to land the plane. There was only a single casualty, a stewardess whose body was never found. DALLAS – On April 28, 1988, Aloha Airlines (AQ) flight 243 suffered an explosive decompression. The incident would have far-reaching consequences for aviation safety policies and procedures. During the explosion, the ceiling of the AQ Boeing 737-200 was torn open. The Captain was able to land the damaged jet safely at Kahului Airport (OGG) on Maui with 65 passengers and crew on board... Read story https://allthatsreallymatters.blogspot.com/2023/05/remembering-aloha-airlines-flight-243.html?m=1 Sadly, there was one fatality, Clarabelle Lansing. The jettisoned Flight Attendant would never be found. Prior to the flight from Hilo to Honolulu, the Boeing 737-200 aircraft had undergone a normal walkaround pre-flight inspection by the First Officer, who did not find anything unusual. At 13:25, flight 243 departed for the capital that it would never reach on that day. When the airplane climbed to 24,000 feet, an explosive decompression took place. At that moment, the roof flew off of the aircraft, and the 58-year-old flight attendant, Clarabelle Lansing, who was in row 5, was ejected into the void. Co-pilot Tompkins was flying the aircraft when the incident occurred; 44-year-old Captain Robert Schornstheimer took over and steered the aircraft to begin an emergency descent to Maui, managing to land the aircraft safely without taking any more lives. In addition to Lansing’s fatality, seven passengers and another FA had serious injuries. Prior to the day of the incident, the Boeing 737-200 aircraft had accumulated 89,680 flight cycles and 35,496 flight hours. It was later known that just before departure, damage to the aircraft was reported by a passenger who, at that moment, did not mention it to the crew. Investigation The anomaly found by the initial investigation was a longitudinal fuselage crack, which, after checks, turned out to be a fissure in the upper row of rivets along the stringer S-10L lap joint. The approximate location of the failure was found between the cabin door and the jet bridge hood. The Boeing 737-200 was damaged beyond repair and was dismantled on site. Additional damage to the airplane included damaged and dented horizontal stabilizers, both of which had been struck by flying debris. Further investigations disclosed that the primary damage was caused by the total separation of the upper crown skin and other fuselage structures. According to videos taken during and after the landing, the failure extended from the small aft of the main cabin to the entrance door aft, running 18 feet. Due to the findings, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined that the failure of the AQ maintenance program to detect the presence of significant disbonding and fatigue damage was the probable cause of the accident. As fuselage examinations of the aircraft were scheduled during the night, this made it more difficult to carry out an adequate inspection of its outer skin. Before the incident, AQ used a maintenance program based on a D-check (heavy maintenance and inspection check) interval of 15,000 flight hours, according to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). At the time of the incident, however, Boeing recommended a 20,000 flight-hour interval. While Boeing’s Maintenance Planning Document proposed a D-check a few weeks apart, AQ separated the check into 52 separate work packages. Parts of D-check items were included in the overnight B-checks.

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